In many ways coming to the skeptical apotheosis as we have, one may be inclined to fall into nihilsim (a consequence that we will explore later). If we don't know, then what's the point? Who cares? Why put in the effort? However, we don't have to. It's one side of the coin we find ourselves occupying, with the other side of the coin being one of a more stoic stance. We can have all of these same questions and be indifferent about them (easier said than done), or develop our own trajectory to solve them (without falling into solipsism, but rather a sort of specific and particular relativism that is not absolutist).

Nietzsche propounded that in a world and existence that may ultimately be devoid of meaning, we are not precluded from creating our own meaning that is of the utmost value to us subjectively and that is still devoid of absolute meaning.

Camus expanded on this with absurdism, stipulating that in living, attempting to live the best lives we can subjectively, we effectively defy and make a stand against such as an act of revolt. Camus thought that once we end up at the peak of nihilism we have a few choices of which we may act from: placing faith in some other system (whether it's science, religion, etc.), commit suicide in the face of the utter meaninglessness, or live and be regardless of such a conclusion (simply, you don't have to care that there appears to be no absolute meaning to our existence or that of reality (it's neither good nor bad; stoicism)). This last one is where Camus leans, but it's also one of the most difficult positions to adhere to. As Camus observed, the brutality of our nihilistic predicament is not so much simply that there is no meaning, but rather that there is no meaning and we are creatures that seem to necessitate meaning (as Mckenna said, “we are meaning makers”). We can find meaning in that which moves us deeply, find hope on our own accord, and ultimately, be the captains and stewards of our own destinies. All this in spite of and in the face of “meaninglessness.”

It seems that such meaning can be subjectively developed through balanced perspectives, breadth of perspectives with thoughtful specificity, even without knowledge, getting to the core and/or fundamental of understanding. From our understanding, we can decide, describe, and delineate what somethings means to us as individuals.

While meaning and knowledge are very different things, they have what appear to be some important connections to each other with respect to ideas of belief and faith (if one does not know then how can one say what something means outside of what it means to them?), which we will explore next (and I'll be honest, what happens to be on my mind more than this section).

We may revisit some of this

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Taking a page out of Descarte's book and bringing myself into this in this one. I hope you enjoy.

The word and concept of belief and I have a weird relationship. I don't really have beliefs, not conscious and/or rational ones (the first being of a set that I am aware of and the latter being beliefs built out of ideals) and the ones one may say I do have are very few. To expand on this, it may be appropriate (perhaps even more appropriate) to say that I don't have much conviction (though I have the conviction that I don't have much conviction). Anything that could be said that I believe, one could say that I don't have much conviction in such belief. However, stipulating that I don't have much conviction actually brings us back to I don't really have beliefs. Conviction is inherent to beliefs in the way belief is commonly used. So, again, I don't have beliefs in a traditional sense, but rather feelings and thoughts, of different magnitudes and degrees, based on observation, thought, and experience.

Lets revisit some of what we've already covered, and some items that will be new, with regard to belief.
-One can believe something and that “something” can at the same time not be true.
-But, when we believe something, we at least feel and/or think its true. Or we have chosen to subscribe to the idea that that “something” is true.
-And some beliefs are more out of a utility or convenience than they are reflective of truth, such as things we choose to believe though we're aware we can't verify, though the one believing will hold they believe it's true.
-Moreover, it seems to be true that identifying and stipulating other truths may very well greatly depend on a perspective, and as such an opposing or contradictory perspective may not align with any ideals of truth specified by the first perspective.
-If one expects to have their beliefs to be adherent to truth as much as possible then all beliefs will therein need to be under constant scrutiny, for any belief can be wrong and if adherent to truth should be subject to change when presented with "better" information. Thus, there perhaps should not be any beliefs that are not subject to scrutiny and change.
-And again, if no one knows everything and no one is right all the time, then we all believe things that are false unbeknownst to us.
As a result of this observation is why my stance on belief is what it is.

Granted there are beliefs that are inconsequential to our epistemic concerns: “I believe pink is an attractive color,” “I believe some movies are a pleasurable experience,” etc. But these beliefs can be categorized as opinions, and that's not really what we're considering. These are free-form beliefs, that while able to impact the world (opinions of some impact opinions of others and from those opinions aspects of the world can change; eg "it's a good idea to put a pipeline here”), have little to do aside from their implicit connections, to reality outside of ourselves.

I like my beliefs like I like my tea: loose leaf beliefs

-Fact is paradigm based. Idea of fact is projection of how we want world to be, nested in a paradigm framework of thought and perception to interpret the world. We can notice this by virtue of varying identification of fact between two disparate minds: there are ideas that some may hold as a fact while others do not.
-The notion of fact is also an ideal: it's ontological nature in the framework of reality is abstract, not concrete.
-In x paradigm, a proposition is true and a fact.
-Only facts that may be exceptions are tautologies.
-Due to the appearance of rigor and ubiquity within certain paradigms, facts can be said to be consensus opinions.
-Opinions run the [human] world in many, but not all, ways.
-There a great many ideals, concepts and paradigms of such in the world, those we "choose"as ones we derive truth from, come to us mainly out of happenstance. We don't control the initial ideas that are introduced to us that we then assimilate and operate off of and act from.
-While we each would like to think that what we believe and think are ideas that are true, such truth is delimited by said idea's influence outside of our control and conditioned into us. So how much truth are we really experiencing and holding? It appears borderline arbitrary. But at the same time not, paradoxically.
-None of this invalidates “facts” that may actually be facts, such as the ontological fact that existence exists (tautology).

Fact is derived from the bias that there should be an answer relative to a particular framework that it is a fact in. Relative to what seems to be the case the most in a given paradigm/perspective dictates if a fact is a fact, ie, fact appeals to what seems the most prevalent to be. And I'm not saying there are no facts, but I am hinting they may not be as weighted as we treat them. Though, for all practical purposes perhaps we should continue adhering to them?

Allow me to expand further. It is considered a scientific fact that the gravitational pull of the earth accelerates objects at 9.98m/s^2. However, does this fact “exist” without the scientific paradigm that the fact belongs to? It doesn't seem so. It seems that, while facts are meant to be objective, as soon as something is observed, then wondered about, then investigated, then interpreted, no matter the format, and had words put to it, that each successive stage removes the “fact” from obejectivity. It's similar to the flaw of compounded inductive reasoning (which doesn't really seem avoidable in some respects). This seems to be just inherent; it seems to the condition that we find ourselves in existing in this way, and may very well be unescapable, which is only bad if one happens to have preferences that lead them to feel so, but this is about knowledge in the sense of certainty as well as the magnitude of our behaviors and attitudes of conviction. Can we not observe in others and ourselves the undercurrent of felt certainty and conviction in some of our statements and propositions?

Something held as a fact is considered a fact, but if history is accurate enough, then it can be observed that there have been “facts” that are no longer “facts.”

Systems are paradigms and narratives to me, but are only pictures of reality and though part of reality not a perfect reflection of reality itself. They are utensils for understanding in particular ways and elicit particular kinds of experience of what we call reality. In this sense, “reality” can reasonably be interchanged with “truth,” specifically, “certain truth” and/or “certain knowledge.”

Subjectively, beliefs are tertiary to my stance of skepticism (primary) and views of paradox (secondary and compliments the primary). While we can believe whatever we want, for me the idea of belief is tied to truth and as such connected to knowledge, so I can believe x is true and not know that it's true. This is my personal hangup. Now, I could also move away from the truth component and idealize more so the aspects of trust, faith, and confidence that a belief exhibits when outside of what can be known to be true (so pretty much everything), but that simply leaves me as suspended as usual when embedded in skepticism, in turn causing a constant realization that I could be “wrong,” and then still entertaining other possibilities, finding difficulty in adhering to specific beliefs committedly and consistently.

I find faith problematic (which we've touched on earlier), I have trust issues, and confidence is an elusive thing to me I also find it difficult to concede to a singular belief structure in a purely subjective way when the aim and prose of said system is laid out objectively.

In speaking about my lack of personal internal faith and belief (though learning to apply such to myself at the very least; I think I've earned it ), we arrive at one of what I consider a few flaws in skepticism. Nothing is exempt, not even me, or this skeptical philosophy.

That said:
An idea that invalidates everything also invalidates itself, for it is not exempt from its own postulates. It is part of its own set. Skepticism can be viewed as paradoxical in two ways, the one previously mentioned, but avoiding positivist claims. Then it invalidates itself through invalidating everything else, yet also bolsters itself by tearing itself down, though never making a claim. It presents itself to sacrifice itself for the points and observations it makes. Its application to everything else overshadows the implications of the application of itself to itself.

That's what I feel sets this apart from skeptical philosophies that I am aware of that came before me; they make claims that bring the claims themselves under the same scrutiny of that which they claim. They state that we don't know and build arguments as to why. For us however, I have built arguments through a prose to inspire reflection and from there showed how it could be that we may not “know” with certainty.”

Simply, it's a kind of hypothetical framing throughout.

To be continued

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Been really busy, and this next section is a little tough to frame, but I am working on it. In the meantime, here's another idea to share.

Karl Popper and Falsifiability

While this original idea pertains to empirical use (namely science), I feel and have felt that this idea can be used by way of thought experiments to assess the accuracy, limits, and veracity of our thinking, reasoning, intuition, inclinations, convictions, and beleifs.

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I find that it appears we have developed systems in order to tell us things that we feel are true about the world. However, it also seems to be the case that all systems can be said to have flaws. Having flaws in the system detracts it from any objective truth or fact therein with regard to insights about the world. There also seems to be no way to scrutinize a system outside of itself, and a reasonably consistent system will likely verify itself (and that's a bias, and in this case, also seems to detract from truth). Developing a system to scrutinize a system will lead one to come across the same circumstance as the system in which the newer system was developed to assess. What it seems that we actually have then are not inviolable and immutable facts or truth, but rather, interpretations that in a given system will be true or facts. That's what we have, interpretations, of the world and can't verify them outside of the systems they are derived in. It seems to be an inherent property. It's akin to Hofstadter's assessment of trying to solve Godelian incompleteness by developing a system broader than the one in question to substantiate true statements about the first system that cannot be proved by the first system (and thus making the system incomplete). While Hofstadter talking about Godelian incompleteness is with regards to formal abstract systems, I feel the analogous thought shared above can be applied to pretty much any system of thought.

In my mind, when something is claimed to be self-evident, I tend to interpret that as something being taken for granted. Our entire apparatus of sense perception seems finely tuned to notice some things more than others (as is the case for other animals to notice things some things more than others that is different from the set of things we are built to notice). Things that stand out and are important to us intersubjectively as a species, within our relevant cultures. Our sense perception is wired with our cognitive bias (mental shortcuts), and in turn our processes of reasoning. We're biased against objectivity by virtue of being human.

Clarence Darrow said, “chase after the truth like hell and you'll free yourself though you'll never touch it's coattails.” I feel that similar sentiments can be said about objectivity, among other things (like discipline or patience; we should always try to attain more, but it will never truly be enough).

I often wonder if ”truth” is more something that is experienced more so than something that is known.

Which then brings me back to Hume such that much of this is analogous to his invalidation of almost everything we think we know by way of noticing that we some of what we say we know are conjectures and suppositions because we don't actually experience, say, a cause for an effect, for example. In this instance, again, he observes that we just see two things happen and then assume one causes another (when they perhaps are just set up to occur in succession, which would be predicated on a property removed from the two “objects” in question).

I am clearly very interested in religion, spirituality, mysticism, and esoterism. But how and why? I have found, through phenomenological investigation and assessment, that there is an appearance and seeming within existence for these two, just on a different, say, ontological and perceptual, layer of our existence (perhaps) from what we are accustomed to (in our pragmatic experience).

Like rational modes of thought, these more intuitive (sometimes almost purely intuitive) modes are also seen through the lenses of potential and seeming. They are also interpretations of the world. They are varied kinds of narrative that provide explanation through symbolism and metaphor. They are unique phenomenological views that can help guide one's trajectory through life. They perhaps show truth in a way that can be experienced, however, I don't feel they give us any knowledge.

That being said, I find that most information found in many of these systems is needless in both the arenas of spirituality and epistemology. The information of which I am speaking can be speculated on upon observation to be seen as potentially inconsequential and fruitless. As an example, but not to target anyone or their beliefs (just sharing my personal perspective), in Christianity, God is a jealous God and demands our worship. This is hard for me to imagine to be so from a creator with infinite understanding for that which It has created (sorry, but I don't acquiesce to providing a Divine Creator with an absolute gender designation). I don't see why It needs worship, nor why it would be jealous, especially if said jealousy is derived from people believing in a “false god;” why be jealous of something that doesn't exist? Different types of perspectives for different types of understanding.

There are elements I observe in aspects attributed to God (or Gods/Goddesses) that seem to be primarily projections of aspects of ourselves.

I think it's also hard not to notice the implementation of certain religious practices that may have nothing to do with anything esoteric and mystical, but are more so implementations for social control and conformity, which I feel is supposed to bring people together under the name of the religion by such practices and observances. Many of these things have little or nothing to do with religious or spiritual “truth” however in my opinion.

Mystical, esoteric, and religious modes of thought provide us with ways of thinking that can guide the trajectory of our lives, giving us different ways to live. They can give us novel perspectives that give us different vantages by which we can understand ourselves. They provide metaphors for phenomena of existence (especially that which seems to evade rational explanation) and understand and grasp the potential aspects and layers of existence. One may say that they seem to give us answers that will satisfy us, but may not provide us with ”knowledge.

Another example can be found in Kundalini and chakra systems. While I won't affirm nor deny such systems as being literally existent, I can see how they can be extant in a variety of other ways. Sure, they may be literal zones and energy centers felt in the body of a being, they could also be symbolic metaphors for such sensations that we have as humans under different circumstances and situations. Regardless, if one is receptive, can have an array of experiences with these “energetic centers” phenomenologically which can directly affect us. However, that tuning in of receptivity to chakra systems that leads to some sort of experience of them can also be a product of the power of suggestion (both external suggestion and self-suggestion). So it becomes a case where it may matter not how “real” chakras are, but what benefits and enrichment we can receive by focusing on the idea, even if it's not literally “real” and say is imaginary. They can be seen as an idea that interprets an experienced series of phenomena in a phenomenological way that leads to some sort of understanding of our subjective (extended into intersubjective) experience.

To be continued...

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There's one (common) mistake in this video I'd like to address. The video states that a computer is intelligent if it can replace a human, however, my understanding is that passing such increases probability that it is intelligent (or sentient), but not that it absolutely is. The tomfoolery of the computer that successfully tricks people can still be abiding by strict programming protocols.

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Can we not observe what we would call “real” impacts from that which we deem to be “imaginary?” A fictional story drives “real” emotional responses (the paradox of fiction), even when one is aware that what they are watching and experiencing is fictional. We seem to have visceral responses to our own fantasies and thoughts (think of the saying “just the thought of it makes me...”). We obsess over cinematic characters and stories. It's something that people will even argue about.

An observation: It seems that we [humans] are constricted and bound by what we would call physicality, but are nonetheless controlled, ruled by, and primarily concerned with matters that are of a nature that we may call conceptual and/or imaginative. One may argue that the conceptual is a great deal more mutable than the physical... Even in fields such as science, that studies the physical material world, we are more concerned with the concepts that arise from our interest in the physical and material.

We are also very much concerned with those things which we are unable to verify, whether pragmatic, cosmic, esoteric, or religious. Again, in my view, if one were to disagree and say they do know “x” from one of the previous matters of interest, I would be unable to concede and think that they may be unable to parse conviction from “knowing.” An exception would be if someone stated that they “feel” they know “x,” for at that point there seems to be an acknowledgment of their own conscious limits to actually know without just feeling that they know and taking such feeling with conviction to also be knowledge.

The experiencing of knowing may not have much to do with anything outside of us though it is representative and concerned with what is outside of us. It may be a subjective state of affairs, and a felt state that we experience. When multiple individuals are in agreement and claim to know the same thing, it's an intersubjective state of affairs and an intersubjective felt sense. And just because a majority views something a certain way doesn't necessarily add any weight to the veracity of the way that is being seen. It's more indicative of them being influenced by the same conceptual factors that leads them to hold similar views as others. There's an element of the power of suggestion that is influential to most people. It seems to be in our nature.

We seem to have very little control over the first concepts that influence us. And by “very little” I really mean very likely, none at all. The sources of such concepts already feel they know what they think, while in this period for each one us individually and subjectively, we don't know what to think. We have no capacity to change what influences us in our foundational states (so, as children).

How harsh should we be then to those who we subjectively feel are erroneous in their thinking? How much of it is their fault or responsibility? It's difficult for any one individual to exhaustively address, remedy, and remove all influences that impacted them before an age where they really began thinking for themselves, if they ever do (and if anyone actually does).

But then, don't many people want an “answer” of some kind? So, could we not say that those that look for an answer in the sense of it being fed to them versus them seeking out and discovering, still aren't really thinking for themselves? To expand further, could we not also say that those that implicitly assume there is an “answer” (likely assuming such as a result of noticing other people doing the same) are also not thinking for themselves, for they're not even questioning and exploring that nature of assuming an “answer?”

The point is that, at some level, we all seem to be suggestible and impressionable. This is something that only makes me more skeptical. Is what one thinks what they think by virtue of their choice to think it, or is what one thinks what they think because they are conditioned to think it? One cannot control how they are educated (nor do they have the judgment, scruples, or wherewithal to necessarily find an issue with how they are being taught, at least not until after the fact, at which point they may feel they can make some assertions about such retroactively; but how much weight does it hold at that point since there are implicit influences from that which is there being assessed and/or criticized?), and what reason, in the moment, does one have to question what they are being taught unless it seems patently absurd to them?

When asking why someone thinks something, usually one will receive answers that are justifications within the paradigm of reason. But is that really why? Does one not answer in such a style out of habit, and such a habit arise out of conditioning, more often than not? If the answer to “why do you think x” isn't based in a conscious reason that can be expounded, how many will assert that the answer (for them) is that it's just what they were taught?

I'm sure (or am I?) we have all come across people saying things about conceptual matters such as “that's not real.” We have perhaps even made such comments ourselves. But what if the statement is in error by way of being overgeneralized? Is in not possible that things in the conceptual spheres are of a different order within the absolute amalgam of “reality?” That is, what if conceptual matters are “real” in a different way from other things that we consider “real?”

I find myself fond of avoiding the words and term “know,” “knows,” etc due to everything that has been shared. I find it more apt to use words like “awareness” and “information” because these terms implicitly remove themselves from anything absolute or definite, since it's already been brought into question what can be known with certainty of which a definite attitude appeals to. Disinformation is still a class of information, it's just erroneous information. Awareness seems to be something that is more on a mutable spectrum, that can be augmented based on certain informational sets. When we say we know something, there is an implicit attitude that what is claimed to be known cannot change. But, again, are we sure that it not changing is something that we have the capacity and ability to know in the first place?

Maybe I'm splitting hairs... but that's just what I do.

It seems to me that for us to come closer to certainty we would need to be able to do two things which seem impossible to do. The first would be to travel both backwards and forwards in time. The other would be to be able to exist in manner that allows us to observe different time periods simultaneously (past, present, future). This way, we could potentially cover all the bases that we can think of that could invalidate our certainty.

To me the world seems to be potentially comprised of these multifaceted mobius-strip like, supervening, polyvalent ontological layers, with fractal aspects, governing various thresholds of various things... but I don't know...

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